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ABSTRACT 
 
Taiwan has played a prominent role in Chinese politics since the founding of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. For decades, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) called for the "liberation" of the island, with the tone of the rhetoric 
changing but not the goal of unification. While cross-strait relations may have 
warmed under the Ma Ying-jeou administration and Sino-American relations 
beyond the Taiwan issue have greatly improved in the past decade, the role which 
Taiwan plays in Chinese nationalism may still lead to an undesired conflict. This 
article highlights the role of Taiwan within the Chinese nationalism and 
specifically how the island's democratisation challenges this narrative. While 
economic relations between both sides increase, these underlying tensions do not 
preclude future military confrontation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Taiwan has played a prominent role in Chinese politics since the founding 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. For decades, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) called for the "liberation" of the island, first as a 
means to increase its legitimacy internationally, and more recently with 
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declining legitimacy of their socialist foundation, to deflect criticism of 
continued one-party rule. When the U.S. granted formal recognition to the 
PRC in 1979, the PRC finally dropped the constant threat of invasion, 
assuming that without American support, formal independence would not 
occur and Taiwan would inevitably "come back home."1 However, the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which followed prevented any short term 
unification plans. After the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan fully 
democratised, the PRC gravitated towards a hardline approach, believing 
that the U.S. encouraged Taiwanese independence and intended to keep 
Taiwan separate. While cross-strait relations may have warmed under the 
Ma Ying-jeou administration and Sino-American relations beyond the 
Taiwan issue have greatly improved in the past decade, the role which 
Taiwan plays in Chinese nationalism may still lead to an undesired conflict. 
In this article, I will first provide an overview of Chinese nationalism 
and the role of Taiwan within this narrative. Secondly, I will address how 
Taiwan's democratisation has created tensions within this nationalist 
narrative. Finally, I suggest that while the continued focus on Taiwan 
prevents a peaceful solution, military conflict should not be seen as 
unavoidable. 
 
 
CHINESE NATIONALISM 
 
Scholars and non-academics have struggled to capture the multiple facets of 
Chinese nationalism, as evident in the massive literature on the subject.2 
Studies of nationalism attempt to subdivide the phenomenon by various 
means,3 often resulting in categories which fit only one country. While this 
may provide some definitional clarity, I will argue that a focus on             
state nationalism which treats the government as the main architect of            
Chinese nationalism (in contrast to popular nationalism4) is sufficient in this 
                                                 
1
  Zhou Enlai had mentioned the possibility of peaceful "liberation" in 1956, but the term was generally seen 
to imply eventual unification by force. Jacques Guillermaz, The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 
1949–1976 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), 181.  
2
  A simple Google search of "Chinese nationalism" returns 124,000 pages in English, with 7,130 items 
under Google Scholar. In addition, 98,800 pages are found with "中国民族主义" (zhongguo minzhu zhuyi/ 
"Chinese nationalism"), accessed 27 March, 2010. 
3
  Richard Caplan and John Feffer, eds., Europe's New Nationalism: State and Minorities in Conflict, (New 
York: Oxford University, 1996); Allen Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," 
Asian Survey 23, no. 8 (1983): 913–933; Lei Guang, "Realpolitik Nationalism: International Sources of 
Chinese Nationalism," Modern China 31, no. 4 (2005): 487–514. 
4
 Jian Zhang, "The Influence of Chinese Nationalism on Sino-Japanese Relations," in China-Japan 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Creating a Future Past? ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007). 
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situation, especially when concerning the Taiwan issue. State nationalism 
highlights the need for a strong central power, consistent with the CCP's 
desire to justify its continued rule. Furthermore, there was little sign of an 
independent popular nationalism in China before the 1990s and what does 
exist today remains largely defined by the CCP.5  
Chinese nationalism should be viewed not as a fixed concept or a 
historical given, but rather as an ambiguous tool used for political purposes. 
Pye states that "Chinese nationalism is what the leaders of the day say it is, 
and this means that it becomes a defence of their formulations of what the 
consensus should be."6 By doing so, official nationalism attempts to blur 
the separation between the nation and rulers.7 A similar blurring of the lines 
is evident in the PRC's official account of Taiwan's post-war status, which 
states that the "Chinese people" recovered the lost territory of Taiwan in 
1945. No distinction is acknowledged between land and people nor those 
under Communist rule and that under the Nationalists.8 Similarly, while 
defining itself as a multi-ethnic state, Chinese nationalism remains at its 
core Han-centered, leading many to equate present nationalism with Han 
chauvinism.9 
This conception of Chinese nationalism, however, remains an 
admitted simplification. While this article starts from a position of 
elite-driven nationalism, one must acknowledge that nationalism in almost 
any context defies such narrow instrumental definitions. Societal influences 
increasingly shape Chinese nationalism, but more in terms of responding to 
state-driven directives rather than presenting an organic alternative. The 
focal points of contemporary Chinese nationalism may be dictated by the 
leadership, but how these factors resonate with the general populace largely 
defines the depth of such sentiments, creating restraints beyond what elites 
may have originally intended.  
New regimes often push nationalism to overcome perceived historical 
wrongs subjected to by other powers. Mondal described Indian nationalism 
                                                 
5
  Che-po Chan and Brian Bridges, "China, Japan, and the Clash of Nationalisms," Asian Perspectives 30, 
no. 1 (2006): 127–156. 
6
  Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 232. 
7
  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983), 110. 
8
  "History of Taiwan," Taiwan Information cite, www.china.org.cn.  
9
  Frank Dikotter, "Race in China," in China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese National and 
Transnationalism, ed. Pal Nyiri and Joana Breidenbach (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2005), 177–204; Kai-Wing Chow, "Narrating Nation, Race and National Culture: Imaging the Hanzu 
Identity in Modern China," in Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, ed. Kai-Wing Chow, 
Kevin M. Doak and Poshek Fu (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 47–84. 
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similarly as ideologically a pole away from colonialism.10 Although only 
small parts of China were de facto colonised by Western powers (i.e., Hong 
Kong and Macao), China's history with Western imperialism (and later 
Japanese imperialism) has a similar influence on Chinese nationalism, 
leading some to state that anti-imperialism defines Chinese nationalism.11 
The success of the CCP transformed Chinese nationalism from primarily 
anti-Japanese in nature to include its Nationalist opposition and the U.S. 
under the broad category of imperialism. Furthermore, CCP propaganda 
framed the party as the vanguard against Japanese occupation, while the 
Nationalists were portrayed as preferring to fight fellow Chinese, 
contributing to the enduring anti-Japanese element within Chinese 
nationalism.12 
Rhetoric of "liberating Taiwan" cannot be understood outside of the 
context of the Chinese civil war. The CCP master narrative of creating a 
socialist society focused on ridding the mainland of imperialist 
encroachment and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 was constructed as 
the defining historical turning point. Since the ROC was supported by the 
U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek was already labeled an imperialist, the only 
means to complete the narrative was to maintain support for military force 
to reclaim the island. Thus, the CCP continued to portray the Taiwan issue 
as a historical injustice, claiming both that Taiwan for centuries had been 
Chinese until Japanese annexation in 1895 and that biological and 
geological evidence supported their position of the Chineseness of Taiwan.13 
An argument can be made that Taiwan was unimportant to the CCP 
until the Nationalists were forced to the island, in part because of Mao's 
comments in the 1930s that Taiwan was beyond the boundaries of China, in 
the same category as Vietnam and Korea.14 Other CCP documents suggest 
that Taiwan was seen as a peripheral entity. The "Message to Compatriots 
on Resistance to Japan to Save the Nation" and the "Resolution of the CC on 
                                                 
10
  Anshuman Mondal, Nationalism and Post-Colonial Identity: Culture and Ideology in India and Egypt 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 144. 
11
  Zhao argues that Chinese nationalism was sparked by foreign invasions. Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese 
Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in China and Democracy: the Prospect for a 
Democratic China, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000), 253; Chih-yu Shih, Navigating 
Sovereignty: World Politics Lost in China (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 84. 
12
  This narrative endured even though the KMT played a far more instrumental role in this than their 
communist counterparts. KMT contributions to liberation were largely ignored until 2005. Jung Chang 
and John Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 211–213; Che-po Chan 
and Brian Bridges, "China, Japan and the Clash of Nationalisms," Asian Perspectives 30, no. 1 (2006): 
135. 
13
  This evidence intentionally omits contrary evidence. First, that Taiwan's indigenous peoples do not have 
a Chinese mainland origin. Secondly, even if geological evidence shows a historical linkage between 
Taiwan and China, this predates the Chinese state. 
14
  Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), 33–89. 
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the Current Political Situation and the Party's Tasks" in August and 
December of 1935 both refer to Taiwan in similar tones as Korea and should 
be united in an anti-Japanese alliance. In the "CCP Declaration on the War 
in the Pacific" in December of 1941, the CCP states their goal of 
encouraging anti-Japanese propaganda and agitation, again mentioning 
Taiwan in a similar fashion as Korea. The Constitution of the CCP in June 
of 1945 also makes no reference to the island. 
China has also assumed that any cross-strait military conflict will 
include American involvement. From the onset of the Cold War through the 
1970s, the CCP implicitly desired formal recognition from the West. 
Despite constant references to the moral and political corruptness of 
American "imperialism," Beijing realised that its security would be 
strengthened by formal relations. This desire went so far that the PRC hinted 
in the 1950s that it would renounce claims to Taiwan in exchange for formal 
relations with the U.S. 15  However, one can presume this option was 
discarded due to its potentially negative domestic ramifications for the CCP 
as much as U.S. disinterest. The importance of relations with the U.S. can 
also be seen in the shift in the CCP party line. Shortly after recognition, the 
PRC abandoned the slogan "liberation of Taiwan" in favour of peaceful 
unification, suggesting Beijing's confidence that without American support, 
such a policy could be successful.  
America dropping its opposition to seating the PRC, followed by the 
1972 Communiqué ("The Shanghai Communiqué") and the 1979 
Communiqué establishing formal recognition gave Beijing officials the 
impression that although unification may not be immediate, the likelihood 
of permanent separation was diminishing. American intent, however, was 
more a policy of engagement and vague dialogue rather than capitulation on 
Taiwan,16 with the U.S. simply acknowledging the Chinese position of 
"One China." As Hickey stated, the term "acknowledge" was deliberately 
chosen to indicate "cognizance of, but not necessarily agreement with, the 
Chinese position."17 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) further shattered 
                                                 
15
  Robert A. Madsen, "The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan," in Problematic 
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (New York: Columbia 
University, 2001), 159; Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the 
Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947–1951 (New York: New Viewpoints Publishing, 1976), xi. 
16
  This could also be inferred by the broadness of the 1972 Communiqué, in that both sides mention the 
general need to reduce tensions and increase peace in Asia, discussing Korea, India-Pakistan conflict and 
Indochina almost as much and in similar vague terms as the Taiwan issue. Guillermaz referred to this as 
both sides making a "tentative sketch of what East Asia could become." Guillermaz 1976: 549; "Nixon's 
China Game," documentary, WGBH Educational Foundation and Ambrica Productions, 2000. 
17
  Similarly the PRC made similar "acknowledgements" of continued American arms sales to Taiwan to 
quicken the normalisation process. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "U.S.-Taiwan Security Ties: Toward 
the Next Millennium" (paper presented at the conference Taiwan on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A 
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Chinese hopes and made American agreements on both military supports of 
Taiwan (the U.S. agreed in 1972 to remove all U.S. forces from Taiwan) 
and recognition of a "One China" policy seem disingenuous. The TRA 
essentially left these relations intact, which the PRC took as a clear violation 
of their sovereignty, with later agreements and actions (e.g., the 1982 
Communiqué, President Bush's approval of military assistance in 1992) 
lending further support to American disingenuousness.  
With these seemingly contradictory positions, Beijing officials 
surmised that Washington opposed a Beijing-led reunification and thus the 
U.S. returned as a prime obstacle in the unification narrative. The only way 
to overcome this obstacle was to raise the costs for American intervention 
and Taiwanese actions inconsistent with unification. Although Chinese 
rhetoric about the U.S. did not return to pre-normalisation levels, their 
unfulfilled expectations continue to taint Sino-American relations with a 
level of distrust which has only been exacerbated by America's support of 
Taiwan's democratic reforms.  
 
 
CHINA'S RESPONSE TO DEMOCRACY 
 
The maintenance of China's Taiwan policy and the necessity of unification 
has aided the PRC in deflecting domestic criticism, in particular the lack of 
democratic reforms. Beijing traditionally argued that Chinese and 
Confucianist culture were not suited for a Western-style democracy. 
However, East Asian democratisation, including Taiwan's own 
transformation, undermines this stance. 18  Taiwan's first democratically 
elected president Lee Teng-hui used this to his political advantage, making 
potential reunification contingent on mainland democratisation.19  Since 
then, the CCP leadership has altered its argument, stating that democracy 
brings chaos, with many drawing a parallel to the Cultural Revolution and 
the potential chaos of democratic reform, with the decline of Russia as 
further evidence.  
Implicit in China's democracy-brings-chaos theory is that foreign 
interests are behind such reforms to keep the country weak by ousting the 
CCP. Similarly, during the Tiananmen protests, Beijing officials drew a 
direct correlation between Taiwan's young democracy and a looming threat 
                                                                                                                                                
Paradigm Reexamined, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. 4–5 January, 1999), available 
online at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-Hickey.htm. 
18
  Democratic reforms in pre-1997 Hong Kong further damage such claims. 
19
  Shih 2003:31. 
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to their hold on government.20 Protestors were viewed as akin to outside 
agitators, making the use of force to disperse the crowds more acceptable. 
While cross-strait talks emerged in 1991, China has refused to view 
democratisation as anything but a potential threat. 
Furthermore, the PRC leadership has attempted to dismiss any 
suggestion that democratisation could alter claims over Taiwan. In practical 
terms, however, it has lead to the ROC that, while still paying lip service to 
"One China," has denounced claims to the mainland and maintained an 
ambiguous stance on Taiwan's future—consistent with a public which both 
sees itself increasingly as Taiwanese or both Chinese and Taiwanese and 
that prefers the continuation of the status quo. Any position on Taiwan's 
future status inconsistent with Taiwanese public opinion would be political 
suicide. As Lee Teng-hui stated "Taiwan has now reached the point of no 
return. The people of Taiwan would never countenance any less 
representative form of government."21  
Instead, the PRC maintains symbolic representation of Taiwan within 
the national legislature, enlisting delegates with no connection whatsoever 
to the island. 22  Furthermore, accepting that Taiwan's democracy had 
changed its status would require Beijing to admit that their demands for 
party-to-party talks (instead of government-to-government) were 
inappropriate. On a practical level, Beijing must treat democratisation as a 
non-issue in terms of Taiwan's political status or accept radical changes to 
the cross-strait dialogue which does nothing to help their own goals. 
Maintaining this stance seems to invite conflict with Taiwan. It 
should not have been surprising then when Lee Teng-hui set equally 
unacceptable conditions for unification talks (democratic reforms on the 
mainland and renouncing the use of force).23 Beijing's response, to label 
Lee a "lackey of America,"24 allowed for the maintenance of the narrative 
by eliminating Lee as a person to take seriously. It also started a pattern of 
discrediting Taiwan's leaders who refer positively to Taiwan's separate 
status as nothing more than independence-seekers. For example, Chen 
                                                 
20
  Although Taiwanese may have emotionally supported the Tiananmen demonstrators, there is no 
evidence that the ROC supported protestors with money or material. John F. Copper, "Taiwan: 
Nation-State or Province?" 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 54–55, 210. 
21
  Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 
(November–December 1999): 9–14. 
22
  The ROC would also likely prevent would-be delegates from Taiwan from filling these seats as well as 
this would be explicitly acknowledging the PRC's conception of "one country, two systems." "China's 
Mystery Delegates a Puzzle to Most Taiwanese," Taipei Times, 1 March, 2003. 
23
  Jou-juo Chu, "Nationalism and Self-determination: The Identity Politics in Taiwan." Journal of Asian 
and African Affairs (August 2000): 313. 
24
  David Shambaugh, "Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence Amid Political Accountability" in 
Contemporary Taiwan, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford University Press, 1998), 242. 
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Shui-bian's proposal of "cross-strait integration" seemed to please PRC 
leaders, but once Chen clarified that this meant rapprochement not 
unification, the PRC returned to a hardline rhetoric.  
Although talk of "liberating" Taiwan ceased with formal relations 
with the U.S., Beijing's efforts to maintain public support for the use of 
force in order to prevent Taiwan's permanent separation continues. 
Furthermore, many Taiwanese officials have been demonised to the point 
that mainland Chinese view anyone willing to negotiate with Taiwan 
regarding the island's future status implies sovereign equality and thus is 
labelled a traitor.25 Even cross-strait negotiations which skirt sovereignty 
issues risk this backlash as any actions not clearly consistent with 
unification is assumed to encourage independence. Conciliatory efforts in 
the past were often undermined by the "victor's mentality" of old cadres that 
were still in prominent positions through the mid 1980s which were 
adamantly opposed to any conciliatory effort which implied equality for 
ROC officials.26 Despite a marked drop in revolutionary rhetoric out of 
Beijing, Taiwan's position in the calculus of Chinese nationalism has 
remained constant. 
This does not mean that the PRC has been inflexible in its Taiwan 
policy. Beijing seems willing to make overtures to Taiwan as long as it 
conforms to their master narrative of a CCP victorious in the protracted 
Chinese civil war. Similarly, mainland propaganda attempts to solidify the 
view that the CCP is China. Any suggestion that the party was not the true 
voice of China would be incongruent with the master narrative.27 For 
example, in talks during the early 1980s, the PRC seemed willing to grant 
Taiwan some form of autonomy after reunification, allowing "One China" 
to be defined beyond a political scope, highlighting historical and cultural 
ties. Once it became clear Taiwan did not wholeheartedly support imminent 
reunification, China ended such talk and insisted that "One China" had a 
clear political definition.28  
More importantly, the CCP continues the decade's old notion that 
once Taiwan reunites with the mainland, China will once again rise to the 
status of a world power and their era of weakness will be over. As Zong 
                                                 
25
  Edward Friedman, "The Possibility of Peaceful Compromise in Cross-Strait Relations," in The United 
States and Cross-Strait Relations: China, Taiwan and the U.S. Entering a New Century, ed. Kenneth 
Klinker (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, 2001), 135. 
26
  Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Yitan Li, "Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of the Election of 
Chen Shui-bian," Asian Affairs: An American Review 28, no.4 (Winter 2002): 209. 
27
  David Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Army?" in Bringing the 
Party Back in: How China is Governed, ed. Kjeld Erik Brosgaard and Zheng Yongnian (National 
University of Singapore, 2004), 24.  
28
  Shih 2003: 52. 
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Hairen declared, "The Taiwan issue is a threshold China must step over if it 
is to go out into the world. If China fails to cross this threshold it cannot go 
into the world or genuinely become a world power; even less can it compete 
with the United States."29 While unification does provide some strategic 
advantages, even a peaceful unification cannot live up to the "cure all" that 
Beijing officials have made it out to be. Perpetuating this nationalistic 
dream places further pressures on CCP leaders to bring Taiwan back into 
the fold. Both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin wanted unification on their 
watch to secure their place in history, yet neither was willing to take a more 
conciliatory approach which would conflict with the implicit "liberation" 
narrative. With the return of Hong Kong and Macao under the "one country, 
two systems" formula, Jiang put added pressure on himself because the 
formula made Taiwan's unification look inevitable.30 While Hu Jintao has 
avoided an implicit timeline, he too must show evidence that Taiwan is not 
forever lost. 
The growing economic integration between both sides has also done 
little to curb this nationalist trend, as it, along with the PRC's own domestic 
economic growth may actually strengthen Chinese nationalist sentiment as it 
reinforces that China is on its way to economic and political superpower 
status. As Lam suggests, the next generation of Chinese leaders, equipped 
with greater economic power, have little reason to decrease their nationalist 
tone.31 A PRC on the rise then may be more inclined to push the Taiwan 
issue.32  
By encouraging such nationalist sentiment and being unable to deliver, 
Beijing officials have produced an unintended side effect. Since the 
government relies so heavily on nationalism, reining in public variants is 
particularly problematic. 33  Nationalism by its very nature plays upon 
history, but if the nationalistic message is unattainable, these unfulfilled 
national desires impose higher pressures for the future. Shih argues that if 
enough unfulfilled nationalism accumulates within a society, these 
                                                 
29
  Zong Hairen, "Responding to the 'Two States Theory'," Chinese Law and Government 35, no. 2 
(March–April 2002): 16. 
30
  Wang Gungwu, "Systems and Cultures: A Perspective on Recent Chinese History," (speech, Ohio 
University, 7 May, 2004). 
31
  Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "The Generation after Next in Chinese Politics," in Chinese Leadership in the 21st 
Century, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanna Kivlehan (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 264–265. 
32
  An aide to Jiang Zemin stated, "The Taiwan problem will automatically be solved once China is 
recognised around the world as on par with the U.S. Can you imagine any country daring to sell arms to 
Hawaii if there was a pro-independence movement on the island?"; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang pulls out 
all the stops in foreign policy," South China Morning Post, 25 January, 1999, 
http://special.scmp.com/chinaat50/Article/FullText_asp_ArticleID-19990928210012708.html. 
33
  Jian Zhang, "The Influence of Chinese Nationalism on Sino-Japanese Relations," in China-Japan 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Creating a Future Past? eds. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), 27–30. 
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grievances will lead to complete devotion to further nationalist causes.34 In 
other words, Beijing's nationalist rhetoric has created a spiralling effect, 
encouraging greater support of the party line in regards to Taiwan policy, 
but also placing greater demands on the government to conform to this 
hardline approach when a more conciliatory policy may be more effective in 
achieving the mainland's goals.  
Viewing Chinese nationalism as a response to legitimate concerns 
over territorial integrity is also misleading. The PRC has continuously used 
the principle of preserving territorial integrity in its argument over Taiwan.35 
With the return of Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan remains the last major 
territory claimed by the PRC not under its control, the last remnant of 
China's humiliating defeats in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, the 
CCP not only accepted the loss of land before "losing" Taiwan to the 
Nationalists (i.e., Outer Mongolia), they have also willingly relinquished 
other territorial claims in recent years.36 Since Taiwan was never under 
control of the CCP or PRC, it also differs from the traditional view of a 
separatist movement. The PRC did not lose control of Taiwan; they never 
had it. Furthermore, Taiwan cannot be seen as a threat to Chinese security 
unless backed heavily by the U.S.37 
Attempting to explain China's Taiwan policy as primarily a function 
of nationalism admittedly oversimplifies the situation. A common argument 
is that the mainland's fear of looking weak on Taiwan prohibits any 
negotiations on the matter and that the CCP leadership would lose all 
credibility if it is weak on the Taiwan issue. The core of this argument is 
that if Taiwan were to reject conciliatory offers from the mainland, the PRC 
would lose face. A mishandling of the issue could also strain the power 
coalition within the CCP, a major concern during the Jiang-Zhu era,38 but a 
concern which persists today. However, several incidents have made the 
                                                 
34
  Shih 2003: 81. 
35
  Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, "Is China's Policy to Use Force Against Taiwan a Violation of the Principle of 
Non-Use of Force Under International Law?" New England Law Review 32 (Spring 1998): 715. 
36
  Since 1991, China has settled border conflicts with six nations and in most received half or less of the 
contested territory. In its agreement with Tajikistan, China conceded to only 1,000 of the 28,000 square 
miles of territory in dispute. Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign 
Affairs 82, no. 6 (November–December 2003). 
37
  While bombing the Three Gorges Dam has been suggested as a means to deter China, there is no evidence 
that Taiwan has considered a pre-emptive strike. "No Plan to Attack Three Gorges Dam: MND," China 
Post, June 10, 2004; "China General Threatens War if Taiwan Targets Three Gorges," China Post, June 
17, 2004;  "Terrorism Part on Taiwan Separatist Agenda," Xinhua News Agency, 18 June, 2004; Peter H. 
Gleick, "Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China," Water Brief 3, The World's Water 
2008–2009 (2008): 139–150; Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Continues Cruise Missile Effort," 
DefenseNews, 23 March, 2009. 
38
  John Wang and Zeng Yongnian, The Waning of the Jiang-Zhu Coalition? (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2000), 7. 
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PRC's stance look weak and yet the legitimacy of the leadership was not in 
question. The mainland's backing down during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis 
1954–1955, the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, and America's 
increased military sales after the 1982 Communiqué all contradicted the 
notion that Chinese nationalism would require a hardline response. In each 
case, the mainland response was limited primarily to harsh criticism, 
suggesting that the PRC is maintaining the policy of being "firm on 
principles, flexible on tactics." A key difference, however, is that in all of 
the cases mentioned, Taiwan was not the party that made China look weak. 
Rather it was America's influence. In the aftermath of democratisation, 
Taiwan's success as a separate entity presents a continued challenge to the 
PRC narrative, one arguably more detrimental to the PRC's master narrative 
than previous incidents. This is exacerbated by the need for Taiwanese 
officials to maintain domestic support on matters which can upset the 
delicate balance of cross-strait dialogue. Taiwan's military purchases from 
the U.S. under the Ma Ying-jeou administration for example directly 
conflicted with the government's more pro-China stance, leading the PRC to 
respond with traditional harsh rhetoric common during the previous Chen 
Shui-bian administration. 
Beijing's ultimate objectives for Taiwan also remain somewhat 
unclear. The PRC certainly wants unification, but, outside of the proposed 
"One China, Two Systems" formula, has been vague on the structure of this 
unified China. The mixed success of Hong Kong under this system has done 
little to entice Taiwan to move towards unification, suggesting that another 
formula may be more appropriate. However, the PRC calls other formulas 
unacceptable (e.g., federalism), thus denying the possibility of a formula 
that allows for the basic continuation of Taiwan's de facto independence 
while committing both sides to unification. Pushing for a hasty unification, 
however, brings greater problems for Beijing. Any large scale military 
action to retake Taiwan would conflict with mainland propaganda, revealing 
that the Taiwanese public was not on the side of the PRC.39 Even if the 
PLA can quickly overcome forces on the island and cross-strait conflict 
does not encourage protests in Tibet and Xinjiang dividing People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) attention, reincorporating a defeated Taiwan into a 
greater China will be politically and economically exhaustive. The only 
clear objective behind military threats or even more recent enticements, thus 
is to maintain hope for unification by preventing formal independence.40 
                                                 
39
  The call to "liberate" Taiwan and references to Taiwanese compatriots always suggested that the majority 
of the island's inhabitants were supportive of the PRC. The implication is that the ROC government and 
other "imperialist" or independence minded Taiwanese were the source of the conflict.  
40
  Michael Swaine, "Tough Love for Taiwan," Foreign Affairs 40 (March–April 2004): 40. 
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THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT? 
 
Historically, the CCP has used force (or the threat of it) to test an opponent's 
resolve and the Taiwan issue is no different. The first major test occurred 
over Matsu and Quemoy in 1954–1955 which arguably backfired, resulting 
in greater American support for the ROC and a weak threat to use nuclear 
weapons to stop Chinese aggression. In 1954 America lifted its blockade of 
Taiwan, making a more ambitious attempt to reclaim the mainland possible. 
Chiang Kai-shek amassed large numbers of troops on the offshore islands 
leading up to the crisis, which perhaps convinced the CCP a heightened 
conflict was imminent.41 Others suggest that following the Korean War, the 
PRC's primary motive was to test the strength of America's renewed 
commitments to the ROC.42  
Regardless of the cause, this show of force accomplished two things 
for the CCP. First, it reinforced the view of American intent on containment 
and made possible the symbolic use of Taiwan to drum up anti-American 
sentiment for China's continued humiliation. Second, it encouraged the ROC 
to maintain the offshore islands. Chiang Kai-shek saw the islands as a 
symbolic link to the mainland and his claims to legitimately rule it. To 
relinquish them after this military conflict would not only signal to the CCP 
military weakness, but would likely encourage those within Taiwan to 
consider Taiwan as a separate country, a consideration dismissed post 1954.  
With Sino-American rapprochement in 1979, the PRC ended talk of 
the need to "liberate" Taiwan in favour of allowing for peaceful 
reunification. However, as Taiwan's democratised, China's willingness to 
remind Taiwan that forceful reunification was still an option became more 
common. While China's threats have changed little, its capabilities to fulfil 
such threats have grown. The combination of Chinese nationalism and a 
belief that war may be inevitable leads Beijing to continue its hardline 
approach. To increase its deterrence capabilities, China has spent an 
exorbitant amount on weaponry, reducing, if not eliminating any 
technological advantages possessed by Taiwan. Recent acquisitions have led 
some PLA officials to believe that within the next decade, the PRC will not 
only have military superiority over Taiwan, but will be able to repel 
"foreign intervention" as well. Taiwan has responded with attempts to 
improve its deterrent capabilities. While the PLA's projection is unlikely, 
the rapid military advances are a cause for concern.  
                                                 
41
  This does not necessarily mean either side expected the ROC to attempt to recapture the mainland, only 
that backed by the U.S. the Nationalists could take more provocative actions against the mainland. 
42
  Noam Kovachi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years (Westport: Praeger, 
2002), 7; Copper 2003: 48. 
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Military improvements have created a chauvinistic mentality that 
China can act more unilaterally concerning Taiwan than before. Beijing 
believes that this will make the U.S. less likely to support Taiwan, turning 
the ROC from "bold and aggressive" to "demoralised and cautious."43 
Although the PLA's capabilities have increased considerably in recent years, 
the focus of military development remains rather limited. Much of the effort 
has been on missile development and cyber-war capabilities, not equipment 
needed for an invasion, which suggests that Beijing's motive remains 
deterrence. This also shows the limitations of Chinese military threats to 
others in the region. The PRC may be looking for a rationale for war, but 
their military build-up heavily favours deterrence or short-term conflict, not 
a full invasion. 
Even assuming that China's military build-up is intended solely for 
deterrence purposes, this does little to decrease tension in the region. China 
has never clearly defined what it would take for a military response and now 
with greater abilities to inflict damage on Taiwan, China may lower this 
threshold. For example, the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 appears to label 
any move that may appear as directed towards independence or Taiwan's 
unwillingness to unify as a potential cause for military action.44 Secondly, 
Taiwan feels inherently less secure because of this build-up and thus seeks 
more military procurements and greater protection from the U.S. More 
generally, China's military build-up and the militant Chinese nationalism 
supporting it encourages Taiwanese to see themselves as different than 
Chinese on the mainland.45 This arguably creates a spiralling effect as 
Taiwan's efforts to assert themselves increase the mainland's belief that 
Taiwan is creeping towards independence. The mainland thus takes a harder 
stance and increases its missiles directed at Taiwan, further encouraging 
Taiwanese to see themselves as different from those on the mainland. 
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44
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the absence of Communist ideology, nationalism has become the primary 
means to unify a population into accepting, if not approving, the continued 
leadership of the CCP. This tool, however, has no clear long-range objective 
other than unification and thus one cannot easily predict what role Chinese 
nationalism will play in the future. As Scalapino stated, as China becomes a 
greater political power, this nationalism could manifest itself in either 
benign (e.g., a focus on a rich cultural heritages) or militant form.46  
Presently, the PRC's nationalist narrative requiring unification 
precludes the possibility of a negotiated political settlement regarding 
Taiwan's sovereignty—even one that ultimately leads to unification. The 
negative rhetoric towards previous Taiwanese presidents simply increased 
support for these men in a way that a cordial approach never could, by 
creating a clear "us and them" image Taiwanese politicians could play upon. 
The mainland’s decision to continue a hardline approach in 2000 likely lead 
to their least desired candidate being elected (pro-independence candidate 
Chen Shui-bian), leaving Beijing officials confused at their lack of 
success.47 This may in part explain not only China's more flexible policy 
since the election of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan, but President Ma's own 
pro-China policy initiatives. 
Beijing has been given ample opportunities to make overtures to the 
ROC short of acknowledging them as a legitimate national government. 
Recent party-to-party talks and increased commercial ties show that 
constructive dialogue, however flawed, may be possible. The culmination of 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the 
possibility of an emerging "Chaiwan" economic union suggest a major thaw 
in cross-strait dialogue and may encourage both sides to conduct 
constructive dialogues on sovereignty issues. China's rise as a world power 
in part requires peaceful regional economic if not political integration, 
Taiwan included. While some expect economic integration to encourage 
political solutions,48 such hopeful thinking, however, ignores the continued 
attempts by the PRC to at least rhetorically separate economic and political 
spheres. Even the means in which ECFA was negotiated intentionally 
resembled party-to-party talks rather than intergovernmental negotiations, 
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further dismissing the dynamics of a democratic Taiwan.49 Furthermore, 
greater economic integration may leave Taiwan sensing fewer political 
options.  
While China attempts to keep economic and political discussions 
separate, consistent with official nationalism, in practice this has been 
problematic, not only in terms of concerns within Taiwan but the 
expectations within China that economic integrations is simply an 
intermediary stage before political integration. Although increased 
economic integration may create greater pressures for both sides to find 
acceptable political solutions to the Taiwan issue, little evidence suggests 
that China's stance vis-à-vis Taiwan's sovereignty will change.  
In contrast to ever more sophisticated approaches to international 
relations elsewhere, China's Taiwan policy remains poorly developed for 
current conditions.50 Despite recent thaws in cross-strait relations and the 
PRC's own belief that time is on their side, the dismissal of Taiwan's 
democracy confounds the mainland's goals as it has allowed a counter 
nationalism to foster. Such backlash is apparent in Taiwan as the perceived 
economic benefits from recent cross-strait exchanges have not overcome 
sovereignty concerns. China may believe that their increased economic and 
political power will propel them to superpower status and in the process 
Taiwan will be forced back into the fold, but the interplay of Taiwan's 
democratisation and the counter nationalism encouraged indirectly by 
Beijing's own actions make this highly unlikely.   
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